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In this paper, a distributed architecture has been pro-
posed in order to support an authorization service more
precisely in dynamically created Virtual Organizations
(VO). In comparison with other existing architectures
such as Akenti, VOMS and TAS, our architecture uses
certificates on top of the distributed agent architecture for
managing requested resources among the VOs. The most
obscure issue in distributed agents is finding the proper
node that keeps the particular requested certificates
In this paper, Chord’s Finger Table has been improved
to add extra search abilities on the ring architecture of
Chord. The process of locating keys can be implemented
on the top of the improved Chord by associating a key
with each data item, and storing the key/data item pair
at the node to which the key maps. In this article, a
theoretical analysis is presented for simulations, which
shows improvement in the number of passed hops to
locate keys in the proposed method in comparison of
standard chord, so it’s more cost efficient.
Keywords: virtual organization, business process, autho-
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1. Introduction
Effective management of networks and systems
requires cooperation of peoplewithin and across
organizations [25]. Today, virtual organizations
are quite common, but accessing the business
processes, modifying and using them are still
a big challenge. In a virtual organization one
of the most important issues is designing and
using the business process securely. In this pa-
per, virtual organization is a collection of col-
laborative entities in a distributed environment
that cooperate and sometimes compete on some
shared and limited resources in a specified mar-
ket. The shared resource and the distributed
nature of the system make the accessibility an
important topic.
In this section, as an application for accessi-
bility of business processes, we refer to aware-
ness model of cooperative management, pre-
sented in [25]. They present collaborative graph
that shows the accessibility of roles on different
tasks. This graph illustrates peer-to-peer archi-
tecture of virtual organization and how business
processes need to be managed by accessibility.
Figure 1. An enterprise collaborative graph with two
processes (Application of the Method) [25].
Figure 1 shows an enterprise that has two pro-
cesses, the first process has roles X, Y, and V
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and the second one has only Z. The first pro-
cess is collaborative since there are at least two
roles with task dependency. In this figure, dark-
labeled circles present roles and others present
tasks. Lines present artifacts, therefore there
are two kinds of lines; (1) which are specified
between role and tasks and (2) which are be-
tween two tasks and present shared resource for
task dependencies [25]. These resources need to
be securely managed to be accessed or updated.
The architecture directs us to accessibility man-
agement in peer-to-peer systems.
The existing delegation systems for virtual orga-
nizations have been proposed based on Central-
ized Management Systems. However, in het-
erogeneous environments like Internet, most of
the time we have to address the issue of sev-
eral dynamically created Virtual Organizations,
each of which independently manages a differ-
ent domain of users by different authorization
polices and rules.
Avirtual organization architecture includes users
and shared resources [1][2][3]. Users who want
to work on a defined target, create a new VO
in the distributed environment and shares infor-
mation among the VOs. So, each VO consists
of users, stakeholders and attributed authorities.
Users join a VO or leave it based on their
needs. Also, stakeholders dynamically change
their policies like available time or resources
provided to users .In a dynamic VO users and
stakeholders can participate in more than one
VO at the same time. Therefore, stakeholders
receive the user requests from different VOs.
Also, a user can request resources from differ-
ent VOs. Fine-grained authorization in virtual
organization enables users to obtain their rights
completely in defined areas. Users should make
their requests in regions defined by stakehold-
ers. For example, a user who has the right to
execute just five business processes on target
resource should not execute more than five pro-
cesses.
In Section 2, authorization middleware is dis-
cussed. Section 3 illustrates Chord and some
other peer-to-peer lookup methods. Section 4 is
focused on some related works. Section 5 dis-
cuses all requirements and goals of the proposed
method. Overview of the architecture and struc-
ture of certificates are presented in Sections 5
and 6 respectively. Finally, some discussion
and results of simulation and analytical results
are given in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the
article.
2. Authorization Middleware
The most popular tool in nowadays virtual
organization computing is calledGlobus Toolkit
[6][11].
2.1. Globus Toolkit Features
The Globus Toolkit normally uses existing lo-
cal resource mechanisms for authorization. A
user is authenticated and then mapped to a lo-
cal identity (e.g., a UNIX account) by a local
configuration file.
This mapping also serves as an access control
check: if the user is not listed in the local map-
ping configuration, access to the resource is
denied. Once the user is mapped to a local
identity, the Globus Toolkit (GT) relies solely
on local policy management and enforcement
mechanisms to constrain the user’s actions to
those allowed by local policy. This approach
removes the fine-grained policy configuration
and decision making from the GT services and
allows the local operating system to act as a
sandbox. Thus, administrators can use normal
policy administration tools to configure policy.
For example, a Globus Toolkit user is normally
mapped to a local UNIX account. Standard
UNIX file system permissions, quotes, group
memberships, and so forth, are then used to
configure and enforce policy.
GT uses proxy certificates to provide delegation
ability, but it can’t support fine-grained autho-
rization. After performing simple authentica-
tion, the resource allows users to use all their
rights. Thus, Globus cannot satisfy several re-
quirements for fine-grained authorization in a
dynamic VO environment.
Recently, more researches have been done re-
lated to fine-grained authorization. A Com-
munity Authorization Service (CAS) [6] [12] is
introduced and designed as a storage for au-
thorization information. In this model, there is
a single CAS server that delegates all sets of
rights to a user, and then the user can use his
rights without any restriction.
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2.2. Limitations of Classic GT
The classic Globus Toolkit authorization sys-
tem [3] has the advantage of being easy for site
administrators to understand and configure, be-
cause it uses existing local policy management
and enforcement mechanisms with which the
administrator is presumably already familiar. In
terms of supporting a largeVO, however, theGT
has several shortcomings:
• Scalability: each personnel or policy change
requires changing policy at each participat-
ing site;
• Lack of expressiveness: native OS methods
may not be expressive enough to support VO
policies;
• Consistency: different native OS methods
may not support the same kinds of policies;
• Distribution: in order to maintain a con-
sistent policy across the VO, each policy
change must be propagated to each site in-
volved. Any failure in propagation will
cause an inconsistency in the policy.
3. Peer-to-Peer Lookup Methods
Virtual organizations usually follow a peer-to-
peer architecture. A fundamental problem in
such applications is efficiently finding a node
that stores particular data. This paper uses
chord, and in the rest of this section, we first
overview chord and then introduce other meth-
ods and compare them with chord. For more
information, readers are recommended to read
[17].
Chord presents just one operation: give a key;
it maps the key onto nodes using consistent dis-
tributed hash table (DHT). Boyvat [22] defines
DHT as “a set of algorithms developed to enable
us to have efficient distributed and decentralized
networks.” In chord, consistent hashing assigns
keys to node as follows. Identifiers are ordered
in an identifier circle modulo 2m. Key k is as-
signed to the first node whose identifier is equal
or follows k in the identifier space. This node
is called successor and is defined by first node
clockwise from k, if identifier is presented as
circle of numbers from 0 to 2m − 1 [17].
Distributed Name System (DNS) provides a
host name to IP address mapping [18]. Chord
can provide the same service when name rep-
resents the key and IP address represents the
value. DNS uses a name structure, while chord
does not use any structure for names. DNS can
not also find data on a practical machine, and
chord can [17].
Freenet peer-to-peer storage system [19] is also
decentralized, symmetric and adaptable for leav-
ing and joining hosts (like chord). Chord has
predictable time for lookup, which is not sup-
ported by Freenet [17].
Glob System [20] has wide-area location service
to map object identifiers to the location of mov-
ing objects. Glob has a hierarchical, topological
and geographical approach for construction of
world-wide search tree. Chord without involv-
ing any hierarchy and high overload handles the
world-wide search [17].
Kademlia [21] provides a DHS. It effectively
treats nodes as leaves in a binary tree, where
each node’s position is determined by the short-
est unique prefix of its ID. The lookup algo-
rithm provided by Kademlia makes it possible
to reach any desired node in logarithmic steps.
Major innovation of Kademlia is that the dis-
tance between points in key space is managed
by an XOR metric. The same as chord, it’s
symmetric as well as decentralized. Chord for
neighbour selection and natural support for se-
quential neighbours work more efficiently [17].
Pastry [23] performs application-level routing
and object location in a potentially very large
overlay network of nodes connected via the In-
ternet. Each Pastry node keeps track of its im-
mediate neighbours in the nodeId space and no-
tifies applications of new node arrivals, node
failures and recoveries. Pastry takes into ac-
count network locality; it seeks to minimize the
distance messages travel, according to scalar
proximity metric like the number of IP routing
hops. Pastry is prefix-based which makes it dif-
ferent from chord. The Pastry method seems
to have more flexibility than the Chord method
because “successor” is not so rigidly defined
with the Pastry identifiers. Pastry, for example,
takes into account network locality by adjust-
ing nodes in its routing table. Chord cannot
handle this problem because there can only be
one successor. Properties, such as the identi-
fier creation and network proximity metric, are
defined by the application using the Pastry sub-
strate. Kelaskar et al [24] present experiments
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and discussions that illustrate that chord has bet-
ter discovery performance.
4. Related Work
The CAS [6] model has been proposed for a
community authorization in the Globus toolkit.
In CAS, each VO has its own CAS Server.
The central administrator who is a trusted third
party, delegates all the necessary rights to use
resources. When a user requests rights, theCAS
server delegates all sets of rights to the user, and
then the user can use his/her rights without any
restriction. The user’s request is then executed
by the resource if the stakeholder maintains a
trust with the certifying CAS service and the
request is authorized by the CAS server.
In VOMS5][8], group memberships and group
rights are managed separately. The VOMS
server like CAS manages group memberships
which indicate a list of users and roles in each
group. Group rights, which are local poli-
cies about group memberships, are distributed
among resources. They are not stored in the
central server. Based upon the roles that have
been assigned to the user by the VOMS server,
the stakeholder decides how much access priv-
ilege is granted to the user. So, a user obtains
the VOMS server’s a priori approval about his
group membership and then resource’s approval
about group rights.
The Akenti [9] model provides restricted access
to resources managed by several administrators
in a distributed environment. In Akenti, the re-
source receives a user’s request, and then passes
the user identity, attributes, and requests to Ak-
enti policy engine for an authorization decision.
The resource complies with the decision of the
Akenti policy engine.
The PERMIS [9] model is similar to the Akenti
model. A user sends requests to a resource with-
out authorization information, and the resource
checks the user’s rights through the PERMIS
system. PERMIS uses a X.509 attribute certifi-
cate for the access control infrastructure.
The TAS [9] model has a ticket-based architec-
ture based on Chord and again like PERMIS
uses a X.509 attribute certificate for the access
control infrastructure.
5. Requirements and Goals
5.1. Requirements
To provide fine-grained authorization in a dy-
namic VO environment, an authorization sys-
tem must adapt efficiently to the dynamic chan-
ges of VOs and satisfy the requirements of each
entity: a stakeholder, an attribute authority, and
a user. A stakeholder participates in one or more
VOs by sharing some or all of its resources.
An attribute authority offers information about
who has the membership of the VO and which
resources are available in the VO. The relation-
ship among entities of VO can vary dynamically
over time, in terms of the resources involved, the
nature of the access permitted, and the partic-
ipants to whom access is permitted. The fol-
lowings are the requirements of a fine-grained
authorization system in a dynamic VO, from the
viewpoint of each entity.
• Stakeholder: Since stakeholders grant their
resources to users in the VOs that they join,
only jobs of users in those VOs should be
authorized. However, stakeholders need not
know the information regarding all users in
the VOs. They only need to ensure that the
owner of a submitted job is a member of
the permitted VOs. In addition, stakehold-
ers should inform users of the amount of
currently available resources for each VO to
reduce unnecessary requests.
• VO Attribute Authority: Attribute author-
ity plays the role of an intermediate bro-
ker between stakeholders and users. If a
stakeholder offers its resource to a VO, the
Attribute authority enables users in the VO
to use the resource. The attribute authority
also keeps a policy that is applied to users.
Through this policy, the attribute authority
assures that users only request the restricted
resources.
• User: Users must be able to know the rights
of an available resource. And he should del-
egate proper rights to processes to allow the
processes to run. According to the policy
of the stakeholder and the attribute author-
ity, resources that a user can access change
continuously in a dynamic VO environment.
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5.2. Goals
This paper proposes distributed authorization
service architecture, with the following ser-
vices:
• Fine-grained authorization method: Altho-
ugh much research has been conducted on
fine-grained authorization in the virtual or-
ganization, the restriction of rightswhen del-
egating user‘s rights hasn‘t been studied ex-
tensively. In addition, only a trusted server
delegates all sets of rights to a user. Also,
few studies have suggested a fine-grained au-
thorization service for stakeholders or users.
Thus, we focus on a fine-grained autho-
rization method for stakeholders, users, and
VOs.
• Guarantee of the authorized resources: Pre-
vious authorization architectures have hardly
been concerned about guaranteeing the re-
source that a user has needed. So, they need
another service for checking resource avail-
ability. We propose a method that the stake-
holder guarantees that the previously autho-
rized user uses the resource.
6. Overview of the Architecture
The certificate-based authorization service ar-
chitecture uses certificates which contain del-
egated rights from each entity in a VO. The
attribute authorities, stakeholders, and users in
a VO issue their own certificates to delegate
their rights. By sharing these certificates, the
VO is constructed. The VO also changes its
policy as each VO entity re-issues a certificate
containing the changed policy. To share and
locate certificates from various entities, we use
a distributed agent system for certificate man-
agement. Agents in the distributed agent sys-
tem share their certificates from the VO entities.
We use a structured peer-to-peer (P2P) system
among agents, so locating certificates is done
efficiently. In our architecture, an attribute au-
thority only publishes the attribute certificate
for each user in the VO. Stakeholders also issue
their certificates, which inform their policies to
the VO. A user in the VO acquires necessary
certificates from the distributed agent system in
order to submit a job. And then, the user sub-
mits certificates including a user certificate to
the stakeholder and runs the job after being au-
thorized by the stakeholder. Here is an example
of the proposed architecture.
In Table 1, symbols are listed to clarify architec-
ture elements which are used in Figure 1. In the
meantime, Figure 2 shows all the architecture
components and relations:
• Tree resource provider centers which are in-
troduced by Site1, Site2 and Site3.
• Two attribute authority centers that belong
to VO1, VO2.
• Tree resource certificate provider center, called
stakeholder, as mentioned before.
• One user from VO1 and two users from VO2.
Table 1. List of names to symbols.
Suppose that User1 who is connected to node
number zero needs a service provided by Site1
and is inquiring for a proper resource certificate
from that resource. Also, suppose that Site1’s
stakeholder has issued and registered resource
certificates on distributed agents with unique
identifiers which are generated by HAS-1 hash
function.
The input of hash function for generating these
identifiers is the combination of service name
and VO name. The resultant string is by itself
a unique string, but to have an equal probabil-
ity of distribution on nodes the hash algorithm
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is used. Also VO2 attribute authority is pub-
lished and an attribute certificate for User1 is
registered too. The identifier of this attribute
certificate is the result of hashing of the string,
which is a combination of VO name and User
name.
As the first attempt for finding desired certifi-
cate by User1 from VO2, the Directory Ser-
vice of VO2 is searched. If any proper ser-
vice is found, that service name and the service
provider VO2 name will be used for generating
resource certificate identifier in common. So,
the results must be the same as the generated
and registered results of Stakeholder 1. Due to
same used string as input for hashing function.
As the next step, User1 from VO2 sends the
produced identifier to agent zero, the node that
is connected to it, and waits for search result.
Another certificate that should be produced by
User1 is the attribute certificate. This certifi-
cate identifier will be the hashed results of the
string which is composed of VO2 and User1.
This identifier will be passed to agent zero like
a resource identifier.
Figure 2. The proposed architecture.
After receiving attribute certificate and resource
certificate from distributed agent, User1 recon-
structs these two certificates as a new certificate
and signs this new one in the name of User cer-
tificate. The generated user certificate is pre-
sented to Site1 and after the authentication pro-
cess, User1 is allowed to use the desired service.
6.1. Certificate-based Authorization Service
The main idea of the proposed architecture is to
use certificates for delegated rights in the VO.
The certificate is unforgivable and exchange-
able among VO entities for resource control.
The certificate record is an XML object that
shows the specified policy controls a resource
in the specified time interval in the certificate.
To protect the integrity of a certificate, each cer-
tificate record is signed by the private key of the
issuer [13]. An example of a resource certificate
has been given in code segment of Figure 3.
Figure 3. Format of resource provider certificate.
6.2. Distributed Agents Architecture
The distributed agent system is a certificate
management system which is independent of
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any site or VO. Agents provide certificate man-
agement services including certificate registra-
tion, certificate location, and certificate revoca-
tion.
We constructed an agent system to improve
Chord P2P system which reduces the overhead
of each service and is about 30% faster than ba-
sic Chord[14]. In the Chord, each node, which
is an agent in our system, has a unique identifier
from 0 to2m−1. In the basic Chord, searching
to find keys is continued only in one direction
on the ring based of the finger tables. Finger
tables have only successors. In the improved
Chord, this process goes on both directions in
the ring based on the finger tables. Finger tables
have both predecessors and successors. Thus,
the number of passed nodes is reduced by about
30% because we marked the passed nodes one
third only by more information in each node.
This statement is illustrated with comparison
between Chord and improved Chord based on
two methods: simulation and analytic model in
the results and conclusion section, presented in
Section 7.2 and 7.3
7. Discussion
In this section, the Chord and improved Chord
are compared with each other. After that, pro-
posed architecture is compared with Akenti ar-
chitecture that is one of most famous authoriza-
tion architectures for VO services. The com-
parison includes these three points of view:
• Security overheads on communication and
encryption/decryption of messages.
• Network overheads and number of gener-
ated messages for client’s requests in both
architectures.
• Search time overhead of each certificate in
database of both systems.
Prior to these comparisons, we implemented our
proposed certificate-based authorization service.
7.1. Implementation
Agents share and provide published certificates.
We implemented the distributed agent-based
model on the improved Chord method, which
is a structured P2P architecture. The agent
performs the certificate registration and loca-
tion service. In the registration service, the
agents save published certificate in the local
xml database and advertise the certificate’s ref-
erence to other agents. In the location service,
the agent finds the advertised certificate refer-
ence and provides proper certificates to users.
The agent architecture is shown in Figure 4.
Axis is a SimpleObjectAccess Protocol (SOAP)
engine that is a framework for constructing
SOAP message service. Agent Service is a mes-
sage style web service that receives and returns
certificate XML documents in the SOAP enve-
lope.
Figure 4. Internal connection.
XMLDB is designed to store and retrieve large
numbers of XML documents such as certifi-
cates. Chord is a Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
– based structured P2P architecture. The under-
lying principle of the Chord is a fast consistent
hash function that is used to map keywords to
some point in a logical P2P ring.
7.2. Chord vs. Improved Chord
In this section, we compare both the analyti-
cal model results and results of experiments by
simulation.
7.2.1. Analytical Model Results
In this section we first calculate the average
number of passed hops for Chord algorithm.
After average number of passed hops for im-
proved Chord algorithm has been calculated and
compared with Chord.
Suppose that N is the number of nodes. In the
Chord we have these equations:
320 A Distributed Architecture for Certificate-based Delegation of Business Process Accessibility. . .
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to one:
P(Hop=1)=1/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to two:
P(Hop=2)=3/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to three:
P(Hop=3)=23−1/N
• The probability of that the number of passed
nodes be equal to n:
P(Hop=n)=2n−1/N
Considering the above four equations, we can
extract the equation below for average passed


































2x(x+1), N ≥ 8
The same process will be repeated for calculat-
ing average passed nodes for improved Chord.
Suppose that N is the number of nodes. In the
improved Chord we have these equations:
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to one:
P(Hop=1)=2/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to two:
P(Hop=2)=6/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to three:
P(Hop=3)=2×23−1/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to n-1:
P(Hop=n-1)=2n−1/N
• The probability that the number of passed
nodes be equal to n:
P(Hop=n)=0
Considering the above five equations we can
extract the equation below for average passed

























⎠ = 2 + 12 + 2
×(23−1 × 3) + . . . + (2n−1 × n)





2x+1(x + 1), N ≥ 8
Now that both equations are calculated forChord
and improved Chord average passed nodes, the











The results of simulations are shown in Table 2.
Analytical results show that we have reduction
in the number of average passed nodes about
34% for N = 16, or m = 4, toward 12% for









Chord 3.18 5.04 7.01 9
Improved
Chord 2.37 4.09 6.02 8
Improvement 34% 23% 16% 12%
Table 2. Analytical results (comparison of Chord and
Improved Chord algorithms).
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7.2.2. Simulation Results
Chord and Improved Chord algorithms have
been simulated and Figures 5a and 5b show the
results of simulation. In our simulation, the
number of nodes is 500 and the number of iden-
tifiers is 5000. Suppose that the starting nodes
for searching identifiers are always a defined
node such as node 1. There are two parameters
r1 and r2 that indicate the number of hops in
clockwise and counterclockwise directions on
the ring respectively. In fact, r1 is the result
for basic Chord algorithm. Both r1 and r2 in
Improved Chord algorithm are shown in Figure
8. The minimum passed hops that are results of
both r1 and r2 are shown in Figure 5a. As Fig-
5a. Result for Improved Chord that is the minimum of clockwise and counterclockwise direction search.
5b. Results for both r1(clockwise) and r2(counterclockwise) direction search.

























Chord 4 2.625 5 3.466 7 4.508 9 5.504
Improved
Chord 3 2.125 4 2.666 5 3.341 7 4.294
Improvement 33% 23% 25% 30% 40% 34% 28% 28%
Table 3. Simulation results (comparison of Chord and Improved Chord algorithms).
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ure 5b shows the maximum passed nodes has
been reduced from 9 in basic Chord to 7 in im-
proved one. More details on comparison of two
methods are shown in Table 3. Considering the
average passed nodes we have had about 30%
reduction in number of passed over nodes.
7.3. Proposed Architecture vs. Akenti
Architecture
As we discussed before, in this section we com-
pare the architecture proposed in this paper with
Akenti architecture. This comparison stands on
three aspects as follows.
7.3.1. Security Overheads
Three main security rules are discussed below:
Server Secure Socket(SSL) – This mechanism
uses Server Secure Socket (SSL) with GSI cer-
tificates, which are based on X.509 certificates.
SSL is lightweight because it does not involve
any XML manipulations. Also, except the ini-
tial handshake, SSL uses a symmetric cipher,
which is known to be much faster than an asym-
metric cipher because it transports layer security
and does not work, if the connection includes
multiple hops, as a feature supported by SOAP.
XML-Signature – XML-Signature is a standard
for digital signatures for XML documents. The
usage of XML-Signature with SOAP messages
is described in WS-Security[15] specification.
With XML-Signature, each message is signed
with X.509 certificate (GSI certificate). It en-
sures the integrity of a message, but it does not
support replay-attack prevention. As opposed
to the WS-SecureConversation, which will be
described later, this mechanism is stateless and
does not need any initial handshakes. Thus, it
is suitable for a single invocation of a service.
WS-SecureConversation – is a relatively new
protocol to establish and use secure contexts
with SOAP messages. First, a secure context is
established between a client and a server. Once
the security context is established, the following
messages are signed using the XML-Signature
standard. It is faster because it uses a symmetric
key to sign messages, but it requires additional
round trips to establish a connection.
Three main methods of protecting message in-
tegrity are discussed before. Figure 6 that is
borrowed from [16] shows the comparison be-
tween SSL and XML-Signature methods. Here,
the focus is on both methods: GT(httpg w/o
Figure 6. Comparison of httpg and XML-signature.
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KA) and GT(XML-signature w/o KA) that are
employed in Akenti and the proposed method.
As the diagram shows, migrating to XML-
signature methods have reduced response time
by about 10% in a simple echo server and client
environment.
7.3.2. Network Overheads
Network overhead is an important factor for
evaluating a network-based system like Akenti
and the proposed architecture. In this paper the
number of generated messages for every client
request is considered as a parameter for network
traffic. By considering Figure 7, the number of
messages in Akenti architecture is calculated as
below (Figure 7a):
NumMessages = 2 + 2 × N
The number of messages for one client request
in proposed architecture is calculated by the fol-
Figure 7a. The Akenti architecture.
Figure 7b. The proposed architecture.
Figure 7. Architecture of Akenti and the proposed
model based on the number of messages.
lowing equation (Figure 7b):
NumMessages = 3 + logN−12
Figure 8 shows the ratio of messages in both
systems for different number of nodes. It is
clear that the increasing number of nodes heav-
ily impacts the ratio.
Figure 8. Ratio of number of messages
(Akenti/proposed).
7.3.3. Database search time overhead
One important feature for the architecture is
overhead in search time. The Akenti system is
not scalable regarding the number of messages.
Thus, the number of agents in Akenti architec-
ture has a limitation that causes problems like
increasing number of certificates on each agent
while the proposed architecture is fully scal-
able and there are no limitations on number of
agents. So, when the number of certificates is
increased, there is a possibility of increasing the
number of nodes. This would cause reduction
of certificates on each agent and also reduction
in search time.
8. Conclusion
Virtual organizations often implement business
processes in distributed peer-to-peer architec-
ture. Shared resources and artifacts make ac-
cessibility of business processes a challenging
issue. One applicability of this issue is aware-
ness of peers in a collaborative business process,
when different peers work on dependent tasks.
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This article proposes a distributed architecture
for authorization of business processes in dy-
namic virtual organizations. This architecture
supports: (1) Fine-grained authorization, (2)
Guarantee of the authorized resources. The ar-
chitecture tries to improve Chord’s Finger Ta-
bles with adding extra search abilities on the
ring architecture of Chord.
In this aspect, Chord’s FingerTable has been im-
proved and Chord has been added extra search
abilities. The evaluation stands on (1) compar-
ison of Chord and Improved Chord presented
in this paper (2) comparison between proposed
and Akenti architectures. The first comparison
has been done by analytical model and sim-
ulation experiments. The second one has been
discussed disruptively in security,network over-
load and database search time overhead criteria.
Results of the theoretical analysis, simulations
and experiments show that using improvedChord
method achieved 30% reduction in number of
passed hops for locating the keys. Hence, Im-
proved Chord is cost efficient, scalable, with
lower communication cost and about 30% faster
than the basic Chord.
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